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SEVEN SEVEN EIGHT  
ON THIRTEEN NOVEMBER

Enclosed is the original of a memo to [redacted]  
to request [redacted] Mark Gittelman of the [redacted]  
A copy of the memo is also included for your  
records along with attachments.

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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
W. RAYMOND WANNALL

INSPECTOR  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH  
HUNTER E. HELGESON

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

IS-1  
BLACK NATIONALIST AND  
WHITE HATE —  
CENTRAL UNIT  
BLACK NATIONALIST AND  
WHITE HATE —  
EAST UNIT  
BLACK NATIONALIST AND  
WHITE HATE —  
WEST UNIT  
BLACK NATIONALIST — SOUTH  
KLAN AND EXTREMIST  
INFORMANT UNIT  
CIVIL DISORDER REPORT-  
ING UNIT

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT  
40

IS-2  
TROTSKYIST UNIT  
COMMUNIST PARTY UNIT  
SECURITY INFORMANT UNIT  
EXTREMIST — WEST UNIT  
EXTREMIST — EAST UNIT

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT  
47

IS-3

PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT  
63

AUTHORIZED  
PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT

	AGENT	CLERICAL- SECRETARIAL
IS-1	18	22
IS-2	21	26
IS-3	22	41

NOVEMBER 6, 1975



INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

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Reorganization - 1955

The Intelligence Division (ID) was known as the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) in January, 1955, and was composed of four sections: Internal Security, Espionage, Liaison, and Central Research. Principal cases supervised in the DID in January, 1955, were Espionage, Internal Security and Nationalistic Tendency matters.

In August, 1955, the Internal Security Section was the volume section in the DID. It supervised investigations conducted under legislation, such as the Internal Security Act of 1950, Communist Control Act of 1954 and the Smith Act of 1940. It also handled investigations of communist front organizations and of subjects involved in possible violations of the Neutrality Act, and Sedition, Treason and the Federal Train Wreck statutes and the Labor Management Relations Act. In addition, the Internal Security Section was responsible for the handling of violations of Federal injunctions, security informants, Alien Enemy Control and related matters, and the Security Index. The Smith Act cases alone demanded considerable time because of the aspect of prosecution involving subjects of these cases. The Internal Security Section was confronted also with the prospect that the Supreme Court might uphold the Subversive Activities Control Board order requiring registration by the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) and its members with the Attorney



General of the United States. It was anticipated that, if the CPUSA and its members refused to register, a heavy burden relating to prosecution of the organization and its members would be placed on the Bureau and, consequently, on the Internal Security Section.

It was concluded, therefore, that by dividing the Internal Security Section into two sections, each headed by a Section Chief, tighter controls over the supervision of the various classifications could be maintained and the vast amount of work more effectively handled. Based on this analysis, the Internal Security Section of DID was divided into two sections during August, 1955. They were identified as the Internal Security Section and Subversive Control Section. The new Internal Security Section was made responsible for all substantive violations of Federal statutes involving the internal security and the Security Informant Program. The Subversive Control Section was assigned the supervision and maintenance of the Security Index, the Emergency Detention Program and maintenance of the Attorney General's portfolio.

Prior to the division, the Internal Security Section had a total of 130 employees, which included 59 Special Agent Supervisors. A total of 57 employees remained in the newly formed Internal Security Section, including 24 Special Agent Supervisors, a Section Chief, and Number One Man. The Subversive Control Section was assigned a total of 73 employees including 31 Special Agent Supervisors, a Section Chief, and Number One Man.

Subsequently, the finding by the Subversive Activities Control Board that the CPUSA was a communist-action organization, and, therefore, required to register with the Attorney General, was upheld by the U. S. Supreme Court in June, 1961. As anticipated at the time of the reorganization of the Internal Security Section, the CPUSA and its officers and members refused to register. Failure to register was subject to criminal sanctions and prosecutions of the Party and its members were instituted.

Subversive Investigative matters being handled by the FBI in 1955 numbered 36,975.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

\* INTERNAL SECURITY - LIAISON BRANCH

Internal Security Section

Section Chief  
Number One Man  
Special Agent Supervisors - 24  
Clerical Employees - 31  
Total Employees - 57

Subversive Control Section


Section Chief  
Number One Man  
Special Agent Supervisors - 31  
Clerical Employees - 40  
Total Employees - 73

\*Following reorganization of Internal Security Section in August, 1955.

(See chart attached)

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PERSONNEL COMPLEMENT

	AGENT	CLERICAL - SECRETARIAL
ISS	26	33
SCS	<u>31</u>	<u>40</u>
	57	73

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\*Following Reorganization in August, 1955  
of Internal Security Section

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

1964 Reorganization

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The Intelligence Division (ID) was known as the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) in 1964, and the Internal Security Branch was composed of three sections: Subversive Control Section, Internal Security Section, and the Liaison Section. Effective June 30, 1964, 112 Special Agents were assigned to DID. Prior to June 30, 1964, 48 Special Agents were assigned to the Internal Security Branch. In 1964, there were 36,918 active subversive investigative matters and 5,622 active racial investigative matters throughout the United States.

Racial unrest and related acts of violence increased significantly in 1964. Investigations and arrests arising out of incidents of racial violence in the South clearly implicated certain elements of the Ku Klux Klan which carried out beatings, bombings, murders and other violent racial actions.

Reorganization of the Internal Security Branch of DID occurred in 1964, to afford improved supervision of the increased volume of information received and to chart new avenues of approach to effectively discharge our responsibilities in the potentially explosive racial field. In July, 1964, supervisory responsibility for investigation of racial matters, racial informants, Ku Klux Klan and related groups together with the development of informants concerning these matters were transferred from the General Investigative Division (GID) to DID. Five Special Agents and approximately 1,350 cases were involved in this transfer. Three Agents formed the Racial Intelligence Unit in the Subversive Control Section and two Agents formed the Racial Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section. In 1965, there were 37,818 active subversive investigative matters and 10,557 active racial investigative matters throughout the United States.

In 1963 and 1964, a number of significant and fast-moving events occurred which directly or indirectly influenced the reorganization of the Internal Security Branch in 1964. A brief summary follows: (1) In June, 1964, three Civil Rights workers on their way from Philadelphia to Meridian, Mississippi,




disappeared without a trace. Their abandoned automobile was later discovered, completely burned out. A massive search involving FBI Agents and other law enforcement personnel was conducted, and 44 days later the three missing victims were found beneath an earthen dam near Meridian, Mississippi. All had been shot at close range. The ensuing investigation determined that members of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, were involved in the disappearance of the three victims, and a Klan official was subsequently convicted on Civil Rights charges. (2) One of the most notorious and widely publicized murders involving Klansmen occurred on July 11, 1964, when Lemuel Penn, a Negro educator from Washington, D. C., was killed by a shotgun blast near Athens, Georgia. Penn, an Army Reserve lieutenant colonel, was driving back from a training session at Fort Benning, Georgia, with two other Negro reservists. A group of Klansmen from the Athens, Georgia, area, were subsequently arrested and charged with the murder. (3) The Klan has been responsible for bombings, dynamitings, and other terrorist acts, and Klan history has been replete with acts of violence. At a Klan meeting in South

Carolina, in September, 1963, a Klan official announced the bombing of a Negro Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, in which four children were killed. All of the fifty members present applauded what they considered to be the "good news."

Attached is a 1964 FBI Organizational Chart for the Internal Security Branch of DID.

FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH  
1964





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INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

Reorganization, September, 1967

Prior to September, 1967, the Internal Security Branch consisted of two sections namely, the Internal Security Section and the Subversive Control Section. A review of the work being handled by the Internal Security Branch was made and it was recommended and approved that the branch be reorganized and the Subversive Control Section be renamed Racial Intelligence Section. This reorganization was put into effect utilizing existing personnel.

The reorganization was made in view of racial violence that had occurred in several cities in the summer of 1967 and the rise to prominence of young black leaders with "black power" and revolution as their goals. For example, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee changed from a cooperative effort by whites and blacks to an all-black organization advocating violence. Black revolutionary organizations with such leaders as H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael were prevalent and associated with violent demonstrations and rhetoric.

Under the new organization of the branch the Internal Security Section handled all matters relating to domestic subversive organizations and individuals associated therewith. This section also continued to handle security informant matters.

The Racial Intelligence Section handled all cases involving investigations with racial connotations including black and white hate groups, black nationalist organizations, associated individuals and racial informants.

This reorganization enabled a concentration of supervision specifically related to the type of activities and individuals involved. For example, the investigation of the murder of three civil rights workers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, which occurred in June, 1964, culminated with the successful prosecution in October, 1967 of seven defendants in U. S. District Court in Meridian, Mississippi. This investigation which was substantively handled by the General Investigative Division was a product of coordination between that division and the above Racial Intelligence Section which provided much of the klan background information assisting in the investigation and also provided for invaluable informant input. This case essentially broke the back of the klan groups in Mississippi at that time.

The Anti-Vietnam War Demonstration in Washington, D. C. (WDC), in October, 1967, is illustrative of the extensive potentially violent demonstrations that were occurring throughout the country during that period. Original plans for these "spring mobilization" demonstrations called for up to 1 million demonstrators to be in WDC and information was developed that they would take part in civil disobedience, turning in of draft cards, and various acts of violence.

Approximately 35,000 persons participated in the efforts, most of which were directed at the Pentagon with approximately 600 persons being arrested. Statistics don't reflect the attendant verbal and physical attacks against law enforcement and guard officials nor do they account for problems which arose as a result of the general immorality displayed by a percentage of those demonstrators. The rioting following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4, 1968, received more effective and concentrated supervision under this reorganization.

The massive anti-war demonstrations and racial violence prompted President Lyndon B. Johnson to declare that "the looting and arson and plunder and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights protest. It is no American right to loot or burn or fire rifles from the rooftops." He further stated that those in public responsibilities have an immediate obligation to end disorder by using "every means at our command..." and "if your response to these tragic events is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster but dishonor" and "violence must be stopped quickly, finally, and permanently."

The case load in 1967 in subversive matters field wide was 33,919 and in 1968 it was 36,154; in extremist matters in 1967, 9,457 and in 1968, 13,740.



The propriety of this reorganization was borne out by increased work load assignments brought about by the passage of the Anti-riot Laws and the Gun Control Act of 1968. (Reorganization chart attached.)

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Internal Security Branch

Espionage Research Branch

Internal Security Section

Racial Intelligence Section

Section Chief

No. 1 Man

Security Informant and  
Special Records Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Communist Infiltrated  
Groups Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Subversive Splinter Groups Unit  
(2 Supervisors)

Communist Party, USA Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Special Cases Unit  
(2 Supervisors)

Subversive Individuals - West Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Subversive Individuals - East Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Section Chief

No. 1 Man

Black Nationalist Unit  
(5 Supervisors)

Racial Informant Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Riot and Racial Disturbance Unit  
(3 Supervisors)

Klan, White Hate, and Nationalist Unit  
(5 Supervisors)

Total Agent Complement  
(Including Section Chief  
and No. 1 Man): 21

Total Clerical and  
Stenographic Complement  
(Including Front Office  
Secretary and Clerk): 24

Total Agent Complement  
(Including Section Chief  
and No. 1 Man): 18

Total Clerical and  
Stenographic Complement  
(Including Front Office  
Secretary and Clerk): 18

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH

Reorganization, February, 1973

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On 2/21/73, the Domestic Intelligence Division was reorganized and the name changed to Intelligence Division. Under the new organizational structure, the Internal Security Branch, formerly the Internal Security and Research Branch, was broken down into three sections designated as IS-1 (Extremist Intelligence); IS-2 (Internal Security); and IS-3 (Research). In the restructuring, work formerly handled by the Revolutionary Activities Section and the Internal Security Section was combined into one section called the Internal Security Section. In addition, the unit handling bombing matters under the former Internal Security Section was transferred to the newly reorganized Counterintelligence Branch of the Intelligence Division. Under the new organizational set-up, the Internal Security Branch was organized so that all domestic security work would come under that Branch. Organizational change was brought about because of the wind-down of the Vietnam War and in light of public clamor concerning domestic security investigations. Changes were made to provide coverage in the foreign field which had dropped to a dangerous level and to reassure the public of the FBI's restraint in domestic security programs. As a result of the organizational changes, the proposed agent complement for the newly formed Internal

Security Branch was 61, a decrease of 10 agents of the previous figure of 71. These individuals were included in the proposed agent complement of 63 for the newly organized Counterintelligence Branch for a total Intelligence Division complement of 124 agents.

The case load in 1972 in subversive matters field wide was 45,956, and in 1973 it was 29,089; in extremist matters in 1972, 22,589, and in 1973, 22,122. (Reorganization Chart Attached.)



FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
INTERNAL SECURITY BRANCH  
FEBRUARY, 1973

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Internal Security Branch

Counterintelligence Branch

IS-1 (Extremist Intelligence)  
Present Agent Complement - 21  
Proposed Agent Complement - 23

IS-2 (Internal Security)  
Present Agent Complement - 16  
Proposed Agent Complement - 28

IS-3 (Research)  
Present Agent Complement - 11  
Proposed Agent Complement - 10

--(Revolutionary Activities)  
Present Agent Complement - 23  
Proposed Agent Complement - Abolish

CI-1 (Espionage)  
Present Agent Complement - 22  
Proposed Agent Complement - 20

CI-2 (Sino-Satellite)  
Present Agent Complement - New  
Proposed Agent Complement - 16

CI-3 (Nationalities Intelligence)  
Present Agent Complement - 21  
Proposed Agent Complement - 17

CI-4 (Liaison)  
Present Agent Complement - 10  
Proposed Agent Complement - 10


Total Present Agent Complement - 71  
Total Proposed Agent Complement - 61

Total Present Agent Complement - 53  
Total Proposed Agent Complement - 63

Total Division Present Complement - 124  
Total Division Proposed Complement - 124


# INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

## SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS



# INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

## EXTREMIST INVESTIGATIONS



# INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED


## SECURITY INFORMANTS AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES





INVESTIGATIVE MATTERS RECEIVED

EXTREMIST INFORMANTS AND  
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES



**Intelligence Division  
Internal Security Branch**

**1970 Reorganizational Plan**

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In 1970 there were 30,002 subversive matters and 19,707 extremist matters being supervised by the Intelligence Division. The Internal Security-Research Branch experienced a substantial increase in work load during this time period.

The Intelligence Division was reorganized in December, 1970. The increased volume of work in New Left and Black Nationalist violence-oriented cases along with a decline in espionage and related cases necessitated this organizational change.

A New Left Section was created while the Soviet and Sino-Satellite Sections were combined. The Racial Section was moved to the Espionage-Racial Branch from the Internal Security-Research Branch to allow for more balanced administration within the Intelligence Division.


**Intelligence Division  
Internal Security Branch**

In 1971 there were 37,137 subversive matters and 26,344 extremist matters being supervised by the Intelligence Division. The Intelligence Division's increased work load was efficiently administered with no additional supervisory personnel necessary as a result of this reorganization.

Attached is the 1970 FBI Organizational Chart for Intelligence Security-Research Branch, Domestic Intelligence Division.

FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION  
1970

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New Left Section created in  
Security-Intelligence  
Branch, 12/70



11/6/75

CRAFT OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS

Domestic intelligence is a comprehensive product resulting from the collection, evaluation, collation, analysis, and interpretation of all available information relating to threats and potential threats to the internal security of the United States posed by groups and/or individuals within this country. Pursuant to Presidential Directives, instructions of the Attorney General, statutes and Executive Orders, the FBI obtains this product through investigations which are initiated to determine if violations of Federal laws relating to Rebellion or Insurrection, Advocating the Overthrow of the Government, Sedition, or other applicable Federal statutes are being committed, and to advise officials of the Executive Branch of Government of such activities so that an informed assessment of the threat can be made.

Intelligence collection is the gathering and possession of knowledge. The area to which the process is applied supplies the characteristics of the process. Intelligence collection is done by investigation. The collection of intelligence for internal security purposes can rightly be called internal security investigation. The comparison of an internal security investigation to a criminal investigation will show no great distinguishing features. Both utilize basically the same

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techniques. What distinguishes the two areas is the goal of each. A criminal investigation seeks prosecution. An internal security investigation seeks to prevent the illegal overthrow or destruction of the established system of government.

This is the primary goal. Prosecutions do occur but they are admittedly infrequent, and are not the ultimate accomplishment of an internal security investigation. Therefore, intelligence investigations are primarily concerned with the potential of illegal activity while criminal investigations are premised on the occurrence of a specific act.

There are two basic kinds of internal domestic intelligence investigations: (1) the general assessment and (2) the assessment of a particular group, individual or incident. General assessments of potential for violence and civil disorders are collected to provide the Executive Branch with a knowledge regarding the potential problems with which it must deal. This information is gathered nationwide from sources whose reliability or good judgment has been displayed in the past.

Contrasted to general assessments in geographical areas are investigations which are directed at specific individuals and organizations. They are investigated because their activities include possible violation of Sedition,

Treason and Overthrow of the Government statutes. Whether the statute has been violated or will be violated is unknown to begin with, for if the FBI waited for all the elements of the violations to occur, there would be no law to enforce or government to enforce it.

Some allegations or indications of subversion are insignificant and require minimal information to refute or to place them in their proper perspective. Because an allegation appears insignificant does not mean it can be handled quickly. While it may eventually be determined that a person poses no threat, an investigation is required to make that determination. Additionally, the experienced investigator knows that the full value of an item of information may not be immediately realized. Often, an item of information triggers an investigation only after it has been reviewed in context with other facts.

Other allegations of subversion are not insignificant and have proven to be of such stature and importance to require special marshalling of Bureau resources to more efficiently gather the information needed. Toward this end, special administrative devices are established to better catalog the knowledge possessed to allow for better investigative correlation, comparison and assessment.

The FBI's programs designed to marshal resources concerning specific groups or incidents will be discussed in some detail in this briefing.



INTERNAL SECURITY  
THREATS - SUBVERSIVE  
1955 - 1975

NOV 3 1975

In the domestic intelligence, or counter-subversive, field, the FBI's primary concern in the time period of about 1955 was the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Both are disciplined and structured subversive organizations whose sole reason for existence is to bring about the violent overthrow of our Government and institution of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Of the two, the CPUSA was, and continues to be, the most dominant and resourceful.

The CPUSA joined the Communist International (Comintern) in 1921, accepting fully the 21 conditions for membership, including unqualified allegiance to the Soviet Union. Passage of the Voorhis Act in 1940 (subject to foreign control) caused the CPUSA to disaffiliate from the Comintern in preference to registering with the Attorney General. During World War II, the CPUSA changed its name to Communist Political Association (CPA) in line with Soviet efforts to solicit support of the United States. In 1945, with the war threat over, the Communist Party Soviet Union (CPSU) ordered the reconstitution of the CPUSA as a militant, Marxist-Leninist organization.

Prosecutions against the CPUSA and its leaders occurred. The Smith Act trials in 1948-1949 convicted 104 persons. In 1957 the Supreme Court ruled the Government must prove "incitement to action" to sustain prosecution and the convictions were set

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aside. These prosecutions resulted in the CPUSA operating in a largely underground level from 1951 to 1955.

The above trials, along with similar prosecutions of James P. Cannon and other SWP leaders, passage of the Labor - Management Relations Act of 1947, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Communist Control Act of 1954, and the Labor - Management and Disclosure Act of 1959 disclose a high level of interest in communist activity by the public, Congress and the Executive Branch. The FBI reacted to the extensive communist activity and related legislation of that period by committing manpower and resources to these investigations.

This situation remained somewhat stable until the mid-1960s. The Vietnam conflict was becoming increasingly unpopular and the old-line communist groups, CPUSA and SWP, became extremely active in organizing massive and often violent protest against Government policy which in effect resulted in at least moral support for the communist North Vietnamese. In addition, many young people, whose lives were directly affected by the Selective Service System, reacted in both peaceful and violent opposition to the war. Out of this turmoil a number of campus-oriented, protest-type groups formed. Some of these groups evolved from protest to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organizations, whose primary aim and purpose was essentially the same as the old-line CPUSA except theirs was an avowed allegiance to the Third World communist revolutionary forces, exemplified by Fidel Castro and his successful revolution in Cuba.

For example, the 1968-69 school year witnessed a heavy wave of demonstrations and violence. During that year there were more than 850 demonstrations on college campuses, including more than 200 instances of building seizures or sit-ins. More than 4,000 individuals were arrested for their disruptive behavior. Damage to school facilities exceeded \$3 million and 61 instances of arsons or attempted arsons were committed. This wave of destruction left one dead and over 125 injured.

An unprecedented number of disturbances and incidents of student-connected violence erupted during the 1969-70 school year.



In almost every category measuring unrest and violence, the figures increased sharply over the previous academic year. In 1969-70 there were 1,785 demonstrations on college campuses, including 313 building seizures by rampaging students. Two hundred and forty-six arsons or attempted arsons and 14 instances of bombing attacks were committed. Nearly 7,200 arrests were made in connection with these incidents, and damages exceeded \$9,500,000. Eight deaths were reported and injuries totaled 462, nearly two-thirds of which were sustained by police and college officials.

Not only have the colleges themselves suffered. The surrounding communities have been severely affected. For instance, William Kunstler, who directed the defense of the now famous Chicago Seven, who were tried for violations of Federal antiriot statutes, spoke to a rally at the University of California at Santa Barbara on February 25. He told his audience that if the President would not listen to the people, then it was each person's duty to be counted in the streets. Following the rally, demonstrators, including college students and other militants, gathered in a park in nearby Isla Vista. They burned the local branch of the Bank of America. It has been estimated that damage to the bank reached \$400,000 and that, in addition, \$29,000 was inflicted in damages to other property.

Following the U. S. troop movement into Cambodia, students at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, left



the campus to demonstrate in Madison. They inflicted widespread property damage which has been estimated at \$270,000. In addition, the payment of overtime to police departments and the National Guard to control the situation during these disruptions reportedly cost the taxpayers in excess of \$300,000.

Another gauge of violence during this period is the use of bombing as a political terrorist act. During 1972 there were 1507 bombings, 714 by explosives and 793 by incendiaries. Twenty-five deaths and 176 injuries were reported with a total property damage value of \$7,991,815.

In 1973 there were 1529 bombings, 742 by explosives and 787 by incendiaries. Twenty-two deaths and 187 injuries were reported and a total property damage of \$7,261,832 was involved.

Not all these bombings were by political terrorists, but the bomb has become an increasingly used weapon in the terrorists' arsenal.

The pressures from the Executive Branch, Congress and public for evaluation of this activity and determination of extent of subversive presence, as opposed to legitimate dissent, was severe and required extensive reallocation of resources of the FBI until the end of the Vietnam War.

From the end of the Vietnam War until the present time the FBI has again been faced with a changing pattern of domestic subversion. Without the Vietnam War as a popular public issue which could be used to reach the public through front group operations (Communist Party, USA - Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice) (Socialist Workers Party - National Peace Action Coalition) and the resulting return of public interest to internal problems and issues, tactics of subversive groups underwent a change. Old-line groups again focused on racial and labor issues consistent with their long-range efforts to reach the workers to build a revolution of the proletariat. Racial minorities have always been viewed as fertile recruiting grounds and are propagandized as oppressed minorities. Furtherance and fomentation of racial and labor strife are essential elements in their basic philosophy of class struggle.

Of more direct and immediate concern are the changes which occurred in the less structured and disciplined groups. Consistently through the Vietnam War years their tactics of protest were more violent, e.g., ROTC arsons and bombings, assaults on military and industrial recruiters, takeovers of campus buildings, industrial and public office bombings, and the like. Property damage was in the millions of dollars and thousands of persons were denied their basic freedom to attend classes, participate in ROTC and meet and converse with persons of their choice.

Out of this atmosphere of violence and espousal of revolution evolved what has been variously described as the counterculture or alternate life-style. The adherents to this innocuous sounding philosophy range from pacifistic, non-competitive dropouts from society and the acid-drug culture victims to the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries operating within this alternate life-style in an underground capacity. The latter, of course, are of serious concern to the FBI. The threat of the revolutionary within the alternate life-style community in turn ranges from the unaffiliated individual who engages in bombings, arsons or assassinations in furtherance of his revolutionary objectives, to cells or small groups operating locally in the same manner, to nationally organized, sophisticated underground revolutionaries such as Weatherman. There are currently 22 Weatherman in fugitive status, 14 others who are missing non-fugitive Weatherman believed in underground status, supported by approximately 250 above-ground Weatherman. Weatherman has claimed credit for 26 bombings and are actually believed responsible for a total of between 35 and 40 bombings. These tactics are plainly terroristic -- the use of terrorism by a small group to force their will, revolution, on the majority.

Further compounding our problems in this area is the prolific use of false identities, frequently of deceased infants. This aspect of the problem is sufficiently severe to cause formation of the Attorney General's Federal Advisory Committee on



False Identification. The intent of this Committee is to try to measure the scope of the problem to law enforcement, its impact on business and devise measures to cope with it. It should be noted that the basic problem arises from a local level in that in most areas births are recorded; however, seldom, if ever, are deaths matched against the birth record and little if any restraint is placed on obtaining a birth certificate. An obituary column in a newspaper morgue for the desired year of birth is the normal first step in obtaining a safe birth certificate, which is the basis to establish a complete false identity. Driver's license, Social Security card, credit cards, etc., are then obtained to complete the identity.

To meet its responsibilities in the domestic intelligence field, the FBI must cope with both the visible, structured and disciplined revolutionary groups such as the CPUSA, SWP and others, along with their various front groups, as well as the more violence-prone revolutionaries in the underground.

It must be borne in mind all of these groups share a common bond of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary fervor. Their differences are in tactics. The CPUSA would appear as a political alternative to the laboring masses who would vociferously fight for their interests, while masking the total domination and control of the Soviet Union. The CPUSA is merely an extension of the Soviet Union in the United States and never knowingly deviates from



Soviet policy or interests. SWP represents much the same facade to labor, while energetically continuing to build party strength for the revolution and follow the international revolutionary concepts of Leon Trotsky. Other smaller groups continue in the same vein, with their own variations on the Marxist-Leninist theme of revolution. However, less rigidly structured but more violence-oriented subversive groups pose a far more difficult problem because their violence requires more covert actions, often completely underground in nature.

November 10, 1975

INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS-EXTREMIST 1954-1975

Modern extremism as it effects law enforcement can be traced to the 1950s and the U. S. Supreme Court decision in 1954 outlawing segregation in public schools. The Ku Klux Klan, which had its origin in the post-Civil War Reconstruction days, had long laid dormant, but forced integration in the South pumped life back into it. Civil Rights (CR) workers championing the rights of Negroes, first on the issue of school desegregation, then equal facilities and finally voting rights, flooded the South in great numbers. Strong opposition by southern whites inflamed tempers and various Klan organizations inspired or directed actions against Negroes and the CR workers, which resulted in the Birmingham, Alabama, church bombing, murder of three CR workers in Mississippi, and the murders of Colonel Lemuel Penn in Georgia, and Viola Liuzzo in Selma, Alabama.

The Klan and its symbol, the fiery cross, became synonymous with activities directed against Negroes, Jews, Catholics, and persons of foreign birth. A wave of floggings, murders, kidnappings, and assaults began in 1950 and continued into the 1960s. Acts of intimidation became so prevalent that local grand juries met constantly and hundreds of local arrests of members of the Klan took

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place. As civil rights protests increased, bombings became more frequent in many areas of the South.

In March, 1965, then Senator Robert F. Kennedy predicted violence in the South and North after Congress passed voting rights legislation. Kennedy said, "I don't care what legislation is passed--we are going to have problems... violence."

Violence reached such a stage that President Lyndon Johnson, appearing on national television, warned the Klan and instructed the FBI to intensify its investigations of the violence being perpetrated in the South. While Klan activities abated, the 1970s have seen another stirring of the Klan in antibusing activity as well as anti-Jewish and civil rights issues in the Nation. Other white hate groups such as the National States' Rights Party, American Nazi Party and the Minutemen had their origin in the late 1950s and early 1960s, basing their philosophy primarily upon white supremacy.

Arising almost simultaneously with Klan activity was black extremism. A dissident group of former National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) members in Monroe, North Carolina, under the leadership of

Robert Franklin Williams, fought back at the Klan. The Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), backing Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's drive for Negro rights, under the militant leadership of Stokely Carmichael and then H. Rap Brown struck out both at the Klan and southern police. Following close on the heels of racial violence in the South came urban riots throughout much of the United States. The 1965 Watts Riot in Los Angeles and the nationwide rioting following the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968, were examples of major disturbances experienced in U. S. cities. Black extremists provided the spark which inflamed many of our cities. Huge conflagrations consumed Harlem, Watts, Detroit, Newark, and our Nation's Capital.

In a July, 1967, address to the Nation President Lyndon Johnson declared that "the looting and arson and plunder and pillage which have occurred are not part of a civil rights protest." "It is no American right," said the President, to loot or burn or "fire rifles from the rooftops." Those in public responsibility have "an immediate" obligation "to end disorder," the President told the American people, by using



"every means at our command...."

The President warned public officials that "if your response to these tragic events is only business-as-usual, you invite not only disaster but dishonor." President Johnson declared that "violence must be stopped--quickly, finally and permanently" and he pledged "we will stop it."

Racial tension in this country exploded into riots and racial disturbances over 200 times between 1964 and 1970. Statistics reported across the country showed over 250 people were killed, over 10,000 were injured, and there was over a quarter billion dollars in property damage. Civil disturbances reached such proportions that a Presidential commission was established and the Attorney General of the United States instituted a data center so as to keep Federal officials aware of riot conditions.

Beginning as early as 1963, mass demonstrations played a major role in this country. Student unrest became an important factor in demonstrations and with it came violence to the nation's campuses. Pronouncements like the following were commonplace:

"This is a revolution. Reformists work within existing rules and regulations; revolutionists

make their own rules and regulations."

"We will use any means necessary to uphold the principle that people of the third world have a right to determine what kind of human beings they want to be. Violence is the best means. It disrupts and terrorizes so that if people of the third world are not allowed to determine their own kind of education, then nobody else on that campus can get any kind of education."

Jerry Wayne Varnado,

Black Student Union Coordinator

San Francisco State College,

"Newsweek," 2/10/69

Statistics presented by The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of The Committee on Government Operations in a publication entitled "Staff Study of Campus Riots and Disorders, October, 1967 - May, 1969" indicate the extent of the problem:

Total Colleges Involved in Disturbances	211
Total Disturbances	471
Black Student Demands Leading to Disturbances	125
Total Estimated Persons Injured	598

(The February, 1970, issue of "Security World" stated that, during the period January 1 to August 31, 1969, losses specifically traced to campus disorders amounted to \$8,946,972)

The widespread and increasingly violent nature of the problem prompted concern to be expressed by responsible spokesmen from all quarters. On October 2, 1969, Senator Byrd said that "events in the news in the past few days concerning activities by militant radical groups should alert us to the new trouble that is brewing on the Nation's college campuses and elsewhere." Senator Byrd said that "all of us would do well to pay heed now, and law enforcement authorities should plan a course of action before the situation gets completely out of hand."

Editorial comment in the September 28, 1970, issue of The Washington Post was also indicative of such concern:

"The college campuses have been targets of bombings and other violent disorders ...Certainly the FBI can be invaluable in helping to crack such cases...

Certainly, the academic leadership must be firm in cracking down on violence; so should local authorities; so should the FBI when necessary."

Out of these troubled times came such groups as the well armed Black Panther Party (BPP), spouting revolutionary rhetoric and engaging in acts of violence like killing police, or "offing the pig" as they expressed it. Basing their philosophy upon the problems of poor and needy blacks, and ostensibly orienting their programs to community needs, the BPP and other violence-prone groups gained a threshold. The BPP, based in Oakland, California, grew from 75 members in 1966 to 1,000 members and 40 chapters throughout the U. S. by 1970. Describing itself as "the armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution," it proclaimed the aim of the Panthers as "We will not dissent from the American Government. We will overthrow it."



From its inception the BPP leaders called for members to arm themselves and learn how to use their weapons. The police were the first target in the BPP program for "liberation" of the black community and the violent destruction of white America. Acts of violence traced to individuals affiliated with the Panthers from 1967 to 1971 resulted in the deaths of at least 12 police officers and the wounding of 71 others.

Separatist organizations such as the Republic of New Africa and the Nation of Islam also offered the extremists the opportunity to advocate violence and the overthrow of existing society. Another form of black separatism emerged in the late 60s and early 70s when large numbers of blacks turned to Pan-Africanism, which is generally defined as total liberation and unification of Africa under socialism. Black extremists, such as Stokely Carmichael, sought to achieve their goals through this movement. Groups such as the Congress of African Peoples, African Liberation Support Committee, and the All African Peoples Revolutionary Party were formed by extremists who called for the destruction of capitalism.

The 1970s have produced extremism of a different nature. Militant Indians led by the American Indian Movement, proclaiming long years of abuse by the white man, profess

to champion the cause of American Indians. Their actions have resulted in numerous confrontations with authorities, including the takeover and destruction of both Government and private property. Two FBI Agents were murdered on the Pine Ridge Reservation in June, 1975.

Bi-racial groups using the country's prison systems as its breeding ground have recently adopted many of the tactics of guerrilla warfare. A prominent example in this regard is the Symbionese Liberation Army which has employed murder and political kidnapping to spread its message.

Extremist groups such as the BPP, which from its inception promoted the stockpiling of weapons, have advocated urban guerrilla warfare. While basing political philosophy upon the teachings of MAO Tse-tung and other revolutionary theorists, activities have been based upon the urban guerrilla tactics used by Arab and South American revolutionaries. Robert Franklin Williams, as early as 1956, wrote that the salvation of oppressed American blacks was "a common household match and a bottle of kerosine." Stokely Carmichael, speaking over Radio Havana the day after the murder of Martin Luther King, Jr., stated "more people are now beginning to plan seriously a major urban guerrilla warfare where we can move seriously to bring this country to its knees."

Urban guerrilla warfare, as advocated by the Black Liberation Army, an off-shoot of the BPP, has been directed toward the overthrow of our present form of government. While extremists espouse causes directed against the evils of society, the first line of society's defense, the police, bear the brunt of such violence. In addition to the 12 police killed and 71 wounded between 1967 and 1971 by individuals affiliated with the BPP, extremists have been responsible for the deaths of 44 policemen and 35 civilians, with 158 police and 129 civilians wounded between January 1, 1971, and June 30, 1975. Extremists and terrorists have since 1971 been responsible for 127 firebombings, 17 arsons, 44 snipings, and numerous other extremist acts.

# SUMMARY OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

November 17, 1975

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## I. Scope and Purpose of Briefing

This briefing will serve as an introduction for the Committee to those activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division during the past 20 years which will be covered in public hearings. The hearings will pertain to programs (COINTELPROs) and allegations of abuse (the investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King) undertaken by the Internal Security Branch of the FBI's Intelligence Division. Therefore this briefing will be a short history of the Internal Security Branch and the issues raised by its activities. The activities of the Internal Security Branch pertain to the FBI's efforts to counter internal security threats, that is, individuals and organizations perceived by the Bureau as "extremist" or "subversive" and not necessarily having any relationship to a foreign power. It does not cover the FBI's counter-espionage mission -- its effort to counter the activities of hostile foreign intelligence services -- which will be covered in an earlier briefing and which will not be the subject of public hearings.

## II. Internal Security Threats and the FBI Internal Security Program

### A. Internal Security Threats -- 1955 to the Present

Bureau officials will describe those threats as being at various times the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and other "old line" structured Marxist-Leninist groups, the Ku Klux Klan, "Black Nationalists" (black militants and some civil rights organizations, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Congress of Racial Equality) and the "New Left." The Bureau officials will provide a statistical analysis reflecting changes in the threats as perceived by the Bureau for the period 1955-1975.

### B. The Craft of Internal Security Intelligence

Bureau officials will provide a general introduction to the techniques of Internal Security intelligence as practiced by the FBI. First, the distinction will be drawn between intelligence collection and traditional criminal investigation. Second, the Bureau will explain the difference between Internal Security intelligence gathering not necessarily directed at any particular group or individual and designed to assess a threat, e.g., general intelligence on civil disorders; and more aggressive intelligence programs directed at particular groups and their leadership and involving COINTELPROs and criminal prosecution. (See F. infra)



### C. FBI Internal Security Policy

A description of the basic policy materials on Internal Security intelligence: ~~Investigations~~ <sup>Investigating</sup>

1. <sup>Investigating</sup> "Subversive matters" (FBI Manual, Section 87) -- pertaining to groups advocating violent overthrow of the government, e.g., CPUSA, SWP and the "New Left."
2. <sup>Investigating</sup> "Extremist matters" (FBI Manual, Section 122) -- pertaining to groups the FBI perceives as racially motivated or terrorist, e.g., Ku Klux Klan, "black hate groups" and modern "urban guerillas."
3. Major changes in investigative policy -- narrowing the scope of investigations in 1973.

### D. Organization of the Internal Security Branch

1. Present Organization of the Internal Security Branch.
2. Five Major Reorganizations in the Internal Security Branch as a Result of Changes in the Nature of the Threat 1955, 1964, 1967, and 1973.

### E. Basic Intelligence Gathering Tools

1. Overt Collection -- Interviews and Public Source Information.
2. Covert Collection Through Informants and Confidential Sources.
3. Covert Collection Through Electronic Surveillance.
4. Covert Collection Through Sensitive Techniques Terminated in 1966 -- Surreptitious Entry, Mail Opening, and Trash Covers.
5. Covert Collection Through Mail Cover, Photographic and Physical Surveillance.

### F. Internal Security Investigative and Neutralization Programs

1. Programs Involved -
  - a. The Establishment of Special Indices for Intensifying Investigation on Leadership of "Extremist" and "Subversive" Groups.
  - b. COINTELPRO Programs.

## 2. Major Programs

- a. Programs Relating to More Than One Type of Organization -- Custodial Detention Program, Security Index, Reserve Index, and the Administrative Index.
- b. Programs Relating to the CPUSA and the SWP -
  - i. "Key Figures/Top Functionaries"
  - ii. COMINFIL
  - iii. COINTELPRO-CPUSA and COINTELPRO-SWP
- c. Programs Relating to the Ku Klux Klan -
  - i. Action Groups, Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index, Key Extremist Program
  - ii. COINTELPRO-White Hate
- d. Programs Relating to "Black Nationalists" -
  - i. Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index and Key Black Extremist Program
  - ii. COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist
- e. Programs Relating to the "New Left" -
  - i. Key Activist Program
  - ii. COINTELPRO-New Left

## 3. Other Consequences of Investigations Aside From COINTELPRO -

- a. Prosecution.
- b. Disseminating information to other Federal agencies when FBI file subjects apply for Federal jobs or security clearances.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

November 17, 1975

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The briefing will be divided into two parts, the first <sup>efforts to counter what I perceived as</sup> concerned with the FBI's <sup>perception of</sup> ~~perception of~~ the major threats to the internal security for the period 1955 to the present, and ~~how the Bureau has attempted to counter that threat.~~ This history of the FBI's internal security function will be con-

ducted primarily by the leadership of the Internal Security Branch. The second part will be a presentation of some of the general legal and policy issues raised by FBI intelligence activities and likely to be raised by public hearings. This briefing will be conducted by Mark Gitenstein and other members of the Committee staff.

## II. Internal Security Threats and the FBI Internal Security Program

### A. Internal Security Threats -- 1955 to Present (This section will be written by FBI officials.)

*flow of various times* Bureau officials will describe <sup>these</sup> threats <sup>as</sup> at various times the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA); the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and other "old line" structured Marxist-Leninist groups; the Ku Klux Klan; <sup>Some elements</sup> "Black Nationalists" <sup>of the Civil Rights movement</sup> (black militants and some civil rights organizations, e.g., Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Congress of Racial Equality); and the "New Left." The Bureau officials will provide a statistical analysis reflecting changes in the threats as perceived by the Bureau for the period 1955-1975.

### B. The Craft of Internal Security Intelligence (This section will be written by FBI officials.)

Bureau officials will provide a general introduction to the techniques of Internal Security intelligence as practiced by the FBI. First, the distinction will be drawn between intelligence collection and traditional criminal investigation.



Second, the Bureau will explain the difference between Internal Security intelligence gathering ~~not necessarily directed at any particular group or individual~~ and designed to assess a threat, e.g., general intelligence on civil disorders; and more aggressive intelligence programs directed at particular groups and their leadership and involving COIN-TELPROs and criminal prosecution. (See <sup>FBI</sup> F. infra.)

C. FBI Internal Security Policy

The articulated <sup>investigation</sup> policy of the FBI with respect to internal security threats is set out in the FBI Manual of Instructions. Section 87 applies to "Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals," and Section 122 applies to "Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest." (See Tab A for the present version of these sections.)

Section 87 defines "subversive activities" as "activities aimed at overthrowing, destroying, or undermining the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions" by illegal means (Sec. 87.a.4.). Section 122 defines "extremist activities" in the same way, but also includes "denying the rights of individuals under the Constitution" (Sec. 122. a. 1. e.). Thus the Section 122 definition of extremist activities appears to include subversive activities. In practice, however, "extremist matters" has meant matters concerning violence prone groups composed of members of one or

another race. Section 122 is intended to cover what the Bureau calls "white hate" groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, and "black hate" groups, such as the Black Panther Party and the Nation of Islam. It also applies to <sup>some</sup> American Indian groups such as the American Indian Movement, as well as a variety of terrorist organizations engaged in "urban guerrilla warfare."

*The Bureau has reason to believe*  
Section 37 has been applied to the activities of the Communist party and other organizations which are ~~or may be~~ <sup>in the process of</sup> what the Bureau describes as "Marxist revolutionary groups," <sup>or which are being infiltrated.</sup> Under this section the Bureau has investigated groups ranging from Communist Party USA and the Socialist Workers Party to the National Organization for Women. During the Vietnam War period, Section 37 provided authority for <sup>wide ranging</sup> investigations of anti-war groups.

Manual Sections 87 and 122 and the general policy of the Bureau with respect to internal security have changed over the years as the FBI's perception of internal security threats has changed. In the middle 1950's the only internal security concern of the Intelligence Division was the Section 87 "subversive matters" area. Most groups investigated under that section were perceived by the Bureau as threats to the internal security of the nation because of some formal or informal relationship to the CPUSA or another "basic revolutionary group." Section 87 was not designed to cover the Ku Klux Klan

as it reemerged during the late 1950's, nor groups which arose as part of the civil rights or black power movements. Until 1964 these matters were <sup>the responsibility of</sup> ~~covered by~~ the General Investigative Division of the FBI, <sup>primarily</sup> as criminal investigations.

The Intelligence Division gained jurisdiction over groups with race orientations in the early 1960's, when it was charged with administration of the predecessor of the "extremist matters policy area (Section 122). (At the time Section 122 was captioned "Racial Matters") In effect these groups became, for the Bureau, threats to the internal security.

Furthermore, with the evolution of the "New Left" and as a result of the anti-Vietnam War movement, the Bureau revised Section 87 to place less emphasis on the old-line, highly disciplined Marxist organizations that had been known as "basic revolutionary groups."

In 1973, the end of the Vietnam War and a decrease in <sup>(and concern within the Bureau over its legal authority to conduct internal</sup> civil rights activities <sup>secret</sup> led the FBI to de-emphasize and actually attempt to limit <sup>those</sup> ~~internal security~~ intelligence activities. <sup>investigation</sup>

The FBI Manual received what Bureau officials perceive as its most significant revision. Since 1973 the Manual has required each internal security case opened by the field to be related to some actual or potential violation of a federal <sup>statute</sup> ~~statute~~.

The statutory predication for an investigation must be designated in the first report on the case made to Bureau headquarters. The 1973 revision also provides, however, that a

"preliminary investigation" may be carried on for 90 days for the purpose of establishing a statutory predication without notifying headquarters. The practical effect of sanctioning these preliminary investigations will be discussed in Section III. D. infra.

D. Organization of the Internal Security Branch

The organization of the FBI in the conduct of its internal security function has, like the various Manual sections, changed as the FBI's perception of the threat and the resultant workload has changed. From 1955 to the present, the FBI has been organized to provide maximum control by FBI headquarters of the activities of the field agents who do the vast majority of the Bureau's investigative work.

At present, internal security intelligence matters are supervised by the Internal Security Branch of the Domestic Intelligence Division. (See Tab B for a chart of the overall organization of the FBI.) The Special Agents of the Internal Security Branch are divided into three sections. IS-1 Section has jurisdiction over Manual Section 122 investigations, "Extremist Matters and Civil Unrest." IS-2 Section covers Manual Section 87, "Investigations of Subversive Organizations and Individuals." IS-3 is the research arm of the Internal Security Branch. Thus, like the Manual, the Branch is organized around what the Bureau perceives to be the two



basic threats to internal security: extremist matters

(e.g., KKK and Black Panther Party) and "subversive matters"

(e.g., "New Left" groups, CPUSA and Socialist Workers Party).

There have been five major reorganizations of the Intelligence Division since 1955, each resulting from significant changes in the role of "extremist" and "subversive" elements in American society, the FBI's perception of their threat to the government, and the change in the Division's workload in the internal security sphere.

#### 1955

In 1955 the Division undertook a major reorganization as a result of the burgeoning workload of the predecessor of the Internal Security Branch. At that time internal security matters were handled by the Internal Security Section, which was concerned primarily with the CPUSA and its infiltration of domestic organizations. By 1956 the allegations of such infiltration were so numerous that the Section had to be divided and its manpower increased significantly. The total number of internal security matters handled by the Division had increased from        to        in the period        to 1955. The FBI increased headquarters manpower from        to        to cover these investigations.

The effect of the reorganization was to create a new section, the Subversives Control Section, which concentrated

on allegations that individuals were either members of the CPUSA or front organizations. The Internal Security Section retained responsibility for determining which organizations were subject to Communist infiltration. Thus the Subversive Control Section conducted investigations of individuals, and the Internal Security Section conducted investigations of organizations, <sup>Subversive Security also continued to investigate</sup> as well as those individuals who were known subversives and considered to be key figures <sup>in subversive</sup> ~~in an~~ organization's structure.

1964

In 1964, racial matters were transferred to the Intelligence Division. A special unit was created within the Division and additional manpower was provided to meet the new workload. *from Gilder Div*

1967

In 1967 another major reorganization was undertaken to respond to the increase in workload resulting from the Bureau interest in black militancy and the so-called "New Left" movement. All investigations of extremist matters (black and white hate groups) were consolidated into one section, the Racial Matters Section, and all investigations of subversive matters (new left and "old left") were retained in the remaining sections.

1970

In 1970 the Division was again reorganized to place greater emphasis on internal security as opposed to counter-intelligence matters. This reorganization was due primarily to the increased workload in the "New Left" area created by the campus rebellion. The reorganization had no significant impact on how the Division handled internal security matters other than to provide additional manpower.

1973

In 1973, the Division received its present structure. With the end of the Vietnam War and the decrease in black militancy, the Division was reorganized to de-emphasize internal security matters and <sup>stress</sup> ~~re-emphasize~~ counterintelligence. Manual changes of that year requiring a statutory predicate for each internal security investigation also reflected this change.

E. Basic Intelligence Gathering Tools

The basic intelligence gathering tools used by the FBI have depended upon the seriousness of the threats and the willingness of the courts and Congress to permit their use.

The most overt intelligence gathering tool is an interview of the subject. There are no restrictions, other than internal FBI policy, on the use of this technique. Agents are limited, however, by the willingness of the subject to

talk, since the FBI has no subpoena power. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

Among the Bureau's most valuable intelligence sources are official records and public sources. Use of public sources, of course, is unrestricted. In recent years, however, court decisions and federal and state legislation have placed some limits on access to official records. The Bank Secrecy Act, the Federal Privacy Act, the Buckley Amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1974 (?) and a variety of state and federal criminal justice legislation have restricted FBI access to a rich store of information. There are still records as to which there are no <sup>restrictions</sup> meaningful ~~restrictions~~ ~~restrictions~~ ~~restrictions~~ however; an important example is tax returns. While the FBI finds legislation limiting access to official records too restrictive, civil libertarians argue that the protection <sup>legislation</sup> such offers is inadequate.

The most useful covert intelligence gathering tool used by the Bureau is live informants and confidential sources. Use of these resources is unrestricted by legislation or case law. A recent study conducted by the General Accounting Office suggests that almost half of the "subversive" and "extremist" cases opened against individuals are based on informant tips. (See Tab F)



An informant is an individual who is paid by the FBI for information on a continuing basis. He is usually a member of a target group, and may have joined the group on Bureau instructions. His activities as a member of the group are directed and controlled by the FBI.

A confidential source is an individual who has provided information to the FBI on a confidential basis but who is not necessarily paid for the information. According to FBI officials the key distinction between an informant and a confidential source is <sup>direction and control</sup> that a confidential source provides information that he has access to because of his job or his position in the community. He does not obtain such access at the direction of the Bureau; the information is already available to him when <sup>he</sup> is contacted by the FBI. Among important confidential sources are school administrators, newspaper reporters, bank presidents, telephone company officials, and law enforcement officers. In many cases the information which these sources provide to the Bureau has been obtained from official records. <sup>in recent years</sup> These <sup>indirect</sup> <sup>information</sup> have been placed

<sup>The use of Confidential Sources by the Department is primarily</sup> As the Committee will see in its public hearings on the <sup>official records</sup> described <sup>above</sup> COINTELPRO program and on the informant program, both informants and confidential sources have been used from time to time for purposes other than information gathering. Confidential sources and informants played an important role in discrediting and neutralizing FBI targets as part of the COINTEL-

At present there are approximately        informants being paid for information by the FBI. There are presently approximately        FBI confidential sources. Each year the FBI expends approximately        on its informant program.

The FBI has very detailed policies pertaining to the selection and supervision of informants and confidential sources and the treatment of the information they supply. These policies will be covered in the Committee's public hearings on FBI informant program on December        . These will be the first comprehensive public hearings on <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ subject.

Until 1972, electronic surveillance was another very important covert intelligence gathering technique used by the Internal Security Branch and its predecessors. In 1972, however, the Supreme Court held that, unless the FBI had reason to believe that its targets are agents of foreign governments, the Bureau cannot engage in wiretapping or microphone surveillance of American citizens without a court warrant. The FBI's use of this technique, the Supreme Court's decision, and a raft of Congressional proposals on the subject have been explored on several occasions by three subcommittees of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Committee. Electronic surveillance per se will not be the subject of public hearings by this Committee. Hearings will touch on specific cases of alleged abuse of this technique, including

*large scale surveillance of Martin Luther King and other individuals at the Presidential Commission in 1964. The staff is investigating other allegations of abuse, covering the*

the "Kissinger 17" wiretap, for use in the Committee's final report.

FBI policy on the use of electronic surveillance for internal security purposes was never articulated in its Manual of Instructions. ~~See [redacted]~~

The use of electronic surveillances, generally, will be covered in a separate briefing immediately preceding the presentation of the public hearings on the FBI's investigations of Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Until 1966, the FBI used a number of other sensitive covert techniques against internal security targets. These included surreptitious entry or "black bag jobs", mail surveillance, and trash covers. Director Hoover ordered use of surreptitious entry terminated in 1966. (See Tab for a recent FBI memorandum suggesting that not only were such operations engaged in against domestic targets prior to 1966, but have been conducted since then.)

Physical and photographic surveillance are covert techniques that continue to be used by the FBI. The King case is a good example of the use of such techniques. In the six years Dr. King was under investigation, he was subject to either physical or photographic surveillance on at least occasions.

There are no comprehensive Bureau policies on the use of these techniques against internal security targets; neither are there federal statutes or court decisions which place any



meaningful restrictions on the use of physical or photographic surveillances

*Internal Sec. Div. of Haiti. Programs*

The Internal Security Branch or its predecessors have from time to time created both a) special investigative programs and b) until April 1971, specialized extralegal programs of "neutralization and harassment" called COINTELPROs. The special investigative programs were designed to give headquarters administrative control over field investigations of the "extremist" and "subversive" groups and were most frequently characterized by the development of specialized indices. These indices gave headquarters a mechanism by which to intensify investigation on the most serious of the threats - usually the leadership of a movement. As we will see later in a separate day of hearings, *individuals on these indices were subsequent subjects* & some of the ~~indices~~ were used to target individuals for COINTELPRO action and others *indices* were used as a master list for detention in times of national emergency.

COINTELPRO grew out of the FBI's frustration over the legal tools which it had available for use against what it perceived as the most serious internal security threats. Beginning in 1955 with the CPUSA, the Bureau decided that because of interpretation by the courts, such laws as the Smith Act could not control the threat of communism in American society. It therefore began a ~~secret~~ program -- CPUSA, COINTELPRO -- to apply against the CPUSA and its members the



the techniques of counter-espionage, including "misinformation" and "double cross." These techniques were first used by the British against the Germans during WWII but were perfected by CIA and FBI against the Soviets during the Cold War. In CPUSA-COINTELPRO the Bureau sought by covert means to disrupt the party by exploiting factionalism and to discredit the party in the eyes of the American public. As other threats arose, the Bureau applied similar techniques against other <sup>groups of</sup> U.S. citizens which it labeled as "subversive" or "extremist" -- the Klan, <sup>subversive</sup> leadership in the civil rights movement, black <sup>extremist</sup> militants and the anti-war movement as manifested in the "New Left."

The major investigative programs included general programs directed at all internal security threats. Among these were a series of indices initiated in 1939 as part of a program of identifying individuals who the FBI perceived as probable threats to the internal security in case of national emergency. At various times, lists of persons who posed such threats were known as the Custodial Detention List, the Security Index, and the Administrative Index. It was anticipated that individuals on these indices would be detained or considered for detention or for more intensive surveillance if such an emergency were to develop. The detention plan preceded its statutory authority (Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950) and survived an explicit order by an Attorney General to

terminate the program in 1943. Even since the repeal of the Title II detention provisions in 1971, the Bureau continues to <sup>keep</sup> maintain a list of about 15,000 persons who were included on the Security Index for detention purposes. A list of about 1,200 persons, known as the Administrative Index, is based on names selected from the Security Index. Persons on that list are described by the Bureau as current threats to internal security.

While statutory authority for the detention program existed, the FBI maintained a special index, the Reserve Index, on individuals who might be candidates for the Security Index and ultimately for detention. While the Justice Department supervised the Security Index, no one outside the FBI knew about the Reserve Index.

Other programs were directed primarily at the CPUSA and other communist organizations and their fronts. Leaders of the Party received special investigative attention. "Top Functionaries," the highest level leadership of the Party, and "Key Figures," the second echelon leadership, were included in the Security Index and tabbed for priority detention. While investigative reports on most Security Index subjects were required only annually; quarterly reports were required for Top Functionaries, and semi-annual reports were required for Key Figures.

Organizations which the Bureau had reason to believe were being infiltrated by CPUSA were investigated under the COMINFIL program. The purpose of this investigation was to determine whether the organization was under the "domination and control" of CPUSA. If so, it was labeled a front by the Bureau and referred to the Attorney General and the Subversive Activities Control Board. The investigation of Dr. King was purportedly a COMINFIL investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

COINTELPRO programs were established against CPUSA in 1956, and against the Socialist Workers Party in 1960. These two programs combined accounted for the overwhelming majority of COINTELPRO actions directed against internal security targets, out of [The CPUSA-COINTELPRO was broad in scope, directed at individuals and organizations not designated by the Bureau as party members or fronts of the party. For example, some of the actions directed at Dr. King and the SCLC were part of this program.] *omit*

We know of no specialized Ku Klux Klan indices or investigative programs. "Action groups" was a term applied to violence prone elements within the Klan. As these elements were identified they were investigated on an individual basis. As far as we have been able to determine, however, no list representing a systematic effort to concentrate investigative resources on each of these groups was maintained by the Bureau.



Some Klan and other white hate group leaders were included in the Rabble Rouser or Agitator Index (described below), but this was primarily a list keyed to black leaders.

A COINTELPRO program was created against the Klan and other white hate groups in 1964. This program was one of the most precisely targeted of all COINTELPROs. It was directed only at the highest echelon leaders, and only operations were conducted.

Programs directed at blacks per se originally were part of the CPUSA or COMINFIL program. The King/Southern Christian Leadership Conference investigation came under this latter heading. In April, 1965, however, the "extremist matters" Manual section (122) was revised to emphasize "black hate" as well as "white hate" groups, and the Bureau began to concentrate on what it labeled "Black Nationalists." As a result of the urban ghetto riots, a special index was created to cover the leadership of the Black Nationalist movement. This index, first called the Rabble Rouser Index and later renamed the Agitator Index, also included some leaders of white hate groups. The Rabble Rouser/Agitator Index and a special list called Key Black Extremists were established to coordinate the investigation of black militancy, and ~~"subversives" in the civil rights movement.~~

In 1967 a Black Nationalist COINTELPRO was established. The extent to which the Agitator/Rabble Rouser Index might have



been used for COINTELPRO targeting is not clear, although the list of Key Black Extremists ~~was definitely~~ used for that purpose.

Investigation of the New Left movement grew out of Section 87 investigations of old-line Marxist groups. It intensified in 1968 in the period leading up to the Democratic Convention in Chicago. In January 1968, a special investigative program, the Key Activist program, was established to intensify investigation on the leadership of the New Left.

In May, 1968, a COINTELPRO directed at the New Left was initiated. Some individuals labeled "Key Activists" were ~~deliberately~~ selected for COINTELPRO action, but like any individual <sup>the foregoing</sup> on a Bureau list or index, Key Activists were <sup>more</sup> ~~most~~ likely to be subject to COINTELPRO action because they received closer investigative scrutiny.

There were <sup>other</sup> ~~some~~ consequences for the subjects of FBI internal security investigations other than COINTELPROS. Prosecution for violation of federal treason or sedition statutes did occur, but has always been rare. ~~COINTELPRO actions were taken with much more frequency than prosecution~~ According to the GAO report, less than 3 percent of intelligence cases are referred for criminal prosecution and most of these ~~are~~ for crimes unrelated to treason or sedition.

There have been other possible consequences. An individual ~~on an FBI index, or otherwise~~ investigated as an "extremist"

or "subversive" could be prevented from receiving a federal job or a security clearance. The FBI acts as the central clearing house for name checks by federal agencies. The Bureau provides information on an individual's "subversive" or "extremist" activities each time the Civil Service Commission or Department of Defense requests a check on an applicant for a federal position or security clearance.

